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capriciously, abused its discretion, and violated the CWA and the APA
when it failed to review Montana's definition of "interested person."
Under the CWA's "general policies," EPA must review and approve
discretionary state policies. The court found EPA's decision not to
review the definition acceptable since the CWA neither requires that a
state define "interested person," nor requires a state to review
procedural policies.
Finally, American Wildlands asserted EPA incorporated and used
Montana standards both prior to EPA approval and after disapproval.
American Wildlands claimed this action was arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, and violated the CWA and the APA. Accordingly,
American Wildlands asked the court for injunctive relief concerning
the issue. EPA countered that since the time American Wildlands
brought the action it had approved almost all of the disapproved
standards at issue, so the claim was moot and the court lacked
jurisdiction. The court agreed with EPA, finding the issue moot for
two reasons. First, the circuit court of appeals could review a decision
to issue or deny a permit under the CWA. And second, EPA had since
approved most of the standards at issue.
The court denied all relief sought by American Wildlands and
dismissed the action with prejudice.
Rebekah King
Am. Mining Cong. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 120 F. Supp.
2d (D. D.C. 2000) (prohibiting the Army Corps of Engineers from
requiring a permit for incidental fallback).
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") authorizes the Army
Corps of Engineers ("Corps") to issue permits for the discharge of
dredged material into navigable waters. The CWA defines "discharge"
as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source," and the definition of "pollutants" includes "dredged spoil."
In 1986, the Corps issued a definition of "dredged material" that
excluded "incidental soil movements occurring during normal
dredging operations." In 1993, a lawsuit resulted in the "Tulloch
Rule," which removed the 1986 exception and expanded the
definition of "dredged material" to include redeposit. Redeposit
includes incidental fallback, or dredged material that spills out of the
container used to remove it and falls back into the water from which it
was taken. In 1997, the National Association of Home Builders
challenged the Tulloch Rule on the basis that incidental fallback does
not constitute an addition under the definition of discharge. The
United States District Court for the District of Columbia agreed and
enjoined agencies from applying or enforcing it. In 1998, the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed. The agencies
promulgated an interim rule ("May 10th rule") removing reference to
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"any redeposit" and specifically excluding incidental fallback. After
the May 10th rule, the agencies began a review to provide more
specific delineation of their scope of jurisdiction over dredged
material.
The American Mining Congress ("AMC") brought suit on behalf of
its members in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. AMC claimed the Corps continued to enforce the Tulloch
Rule in regulating False Cape Enterprises, Inc.'s ("False Cape")
activities in Virginia. AMC further claimed the Corps' requirement
that False Cape obtain a Section 404 permit at the site violated the
Finally, AMC claimed the Corps asserted
court's injunction.
unqualified authority in regulating False Cape's activities. AMC asked
the court to clarify the terms of its injunction against the application of
the Tulloch Rule.
The court first addressed AMC's claim that the Corps asserted
unqualified authority to regulate mechanized land-clearing. The May
10th rule was a result of the court's ruling that the agencies had
exceeded their authority in requiring permits for activities involving
incidental fallback. Since the court invalidated the Tulloch Rule based
on its regulation of incidental fallback specifically, the enjoinder
resulting from the court's ruling also only covered incidental fallback.
Since the court's ruling was limited to incidental fallback, one type of
redeposit, it did not constitute unqualified authority concerning
redeposits generally.
AMC further claimed the Corps continued to enforce the Tulloch
Rule at False Cape's Virginia operation. AMC and False Cape felt its
operations in Virginia did not require a permit. Despite this belief,
AMC did not ask the court to rule that they were not required to have
a permit for those activities. AMC only requested the court clarify its
original injunction to correct the Corps' misunderstanding. The court
refused. In its interim rule, the Corps stated it would determine
permitting requirements on a case-by-case basis until a final rule was
issued. An individual determination would include a decision as to
whether a particular activity fell within the definition of incidental
fallback. AMC's request would require the court to determine
whether a particular activity constituted incidental fall back. The court
left individual decisions to the Corps.
AMC also claimed the Corps was incorrect in requiring a permit
for False Cape's operations. The court's injunction only prohibited
the Corps from requiring a permit for incidental fallback. A ruling
from the court involving any activity other than incidental fallback
would unduly expand the original intent of the injunction. Therefore,
the court declined to make such a ruling.
While AMC sought a broad interpretation of the court's
injunction, the court agreed with the Corps in ruling that its
injunction should be interpreted narrowly. The court held the
injunction only covered incidental fallback and not other unspecified
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activities.
Brian L. Martin
Chlorine Chemistry Council & Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 206 F.3d 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding Environmental
Protection Agency's December 1998 rule adopting a zero maximum
contaminant level goal for chloroform was arbitrary and capricious
and in excess of authority, thus vacating the rule).
The Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA") directs the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") to set standards for the regulation of
certain drinking water contaminants. For each contaminant, EPA sets
a maximum contaminant level goal ("MCLG"), defined as the level at
which no known or anticipated adverse effects on the health of
persons occur and which allows an adequate margin of safety. Once
EPA sets the MCLG, it promulgates an enforceable standard, known as
the maximum contaminant level ("MCL"). The MCL reflects practical
considerations while remaining as close to the MCLG as is feasible.
In 1994, respondent EPA issued a proposed rule setting at zero the
MCLG for chloroform based on an absence of data at the time to
suggest a level below which no potential carcinogenic effects would
occur. In 1998, experts presented scientific evidence demonstrating
exposure to chloroform below some threshold level posed no risk of
cancer. Although EPA accepted this finding, it established the MCLG
for chloroform at zero in its December 1998 final rule.
The Chlorine Chemistry Council and Chemical Manufactures
Association (collectively "Council") petitioned the court to review this
rule and instruct EPA to promulgate a non-zero MCLG using the best
available peer-reviewed science. After briefing but prior to oral
argument, EPA moved for a voluntary remand to consider its Science
Advisory Board's ("SAB") pending report on chloroform. The court
denied the motion. The court explained that since EPA had made no
offer to vacate the rule, EPA's proposal left Council subject to a rule
that they claimed was invalid.
On February 11, 2000, the day of oral argument, EPA released the
SAB's draft report on chloroform. The report stated chloroform does
not act directly on a cell's DNA, and thus low doses of chloroform
involve no carcinogenic effects. After consideration of the draft
report, EPA filed a motion to vacate the zero-level MCLG for
chloroform.
In its motion to vacate, EPA claimed Council lacked standing
because it failed to demonstrate actual injury from the MCLG.
Council contended that a zero MCLG exposed it to greater liability
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act. The court found Council's exposure to higher cleanup costs at least substantially probable with a zero MCLG, as compared

